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Chapter One: An Introduction
In much of Latin America, indigenous people have a complex relationship
with the state. This relationship defines many aspects of an individual’s life,
influencing their social, political, and even economic abilities. Nowhere is this more
apparent than in Guatemala, which has had a more tumultuous relationship with its
indigenous population than most of its neighbors.
Official census numbers show that about 40% of Guatemala’s population
identify themselves as indigenous. The other 60% identify as ladino, which is the
Guatemalan term for people of European or Meztizo descent. Less than 1%
identified themselves on the census as anything “Other” than from these two groups.1
However, Eduardo Sacayón, director of the Interethnic Studies Institute at
Guatemala's University of San Carlos, argues that the percentage of indigenous
people reported is inaccurate, as indigenous people are more likely to not be included
in the census, and that the true figure lies closer to 60%.2 Most experts on the subject
agree that Sacayón’s figure is more accurate, and most estimates land in the 50-60%
range.3
Whatever their percentage in the total population, indigenous Guatemalans
are overall worse off than their ladino counterparts. A report given to the United
Nations in 2010 on Guatemala’s progress on the Millennium Development Goals
1

CIA Factbook, "Background Note: Guatemala", U.S. Department of State.

2

Danilo Valladares, "Forgotten Promises Leave Indigenous Peoples Poorer and Hungrier", IPS Inter

Press Service.
3

Adams, Richard N., "A Report on the Political Status of the Guatemalan Maya" in Indigenous

Peoples and Democracy in Latin America, p. 156
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made this abundantly clear. Nearly 80% of indigenous Guatemalans are poor, while
among the non-indigenous the rate is 40%. Furthermore, while poverty in Guatemala
fell, from 56.2% in 2000 to 51% in 2006, extreme poverty, which primarily affects
indigenous people, fell less than half of a percentage point in that same time.
Indigenous children are far more likely than their ladino peers to be chronically
malnourished, as of 2009 (58.6% of indigenous children are, compared to 30.6%
ladino children). While these numbers have improved since 2002, the gain for
indigenous children has been miniscule (falling less than 2%, from 60.5%),
especially compared to the gains made by ladino children (falling from 35.7%).4 The
differences in these statistics between ladinos and indigenous people are
considerable. Not only are indigenous people far behind the ladinos in all of these
markers, any assistance they are receiving is clearly not making an impact.
Because of these gaps, aid organizations have been channeling aid to
Guatemala for many years. For example, between 1962 and 1979, the Inter-America
Development Bank (IDB) founded numerous projects in Guatemala, covering
everything from agriculture to public health, ultimately providing the country with
more than $384.7 million in programs. Today, Guatemala receives more food aid
from USAID than almost every other country in Latin America, the only exception
being Haiti.5 Annually, they receive more than $32 million in food aid from the US.6

4

Christian Tomuschat, Alfredo Balsells Tojo, and Otilia Lux De Coti, Guatemala: Memoria Del

Silencio for Historical Clarification Commission
5

"Guatemala", U.S. Agency for International Development.

6

"Programmed U.S. Food Aid for FY 2010," United States Department of Agriculture: Foreign

Agricultural Service
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From 2004 until 2008, total estimated funding for USAID’s program in Guatemala
reached $192.5 million.7 In addition to these large international organizations,
Guatemala has become home to numerous smaller organizations. Since the end of
the Guatemalan civil war, the Guatemalan government has permitted civil society
groups to operate in Guatemala.8 These are often organized as non-governmental
organizations, or NGOs, that are relatively small and work on a local level.9
In addition to these outside organizations, both large and small, the
Guatemalan government has created programs in order to address indigenous needs.
However, these programs are often severely handicapped; one of the priorities for the
Guatemalan government is to increase national unity. During the preparation of an
IDB report, multiple senior government officials stressed that the government “is
determined to avoid measures which may promote ethnic tensions and divisions
within Guatemalan society.”10 The Guatemalan Constitution, however, recognizes
the indigenous people of Guatemala, and compels the government to respect and
promote their cultural rights. In 2004, a more serious national dialogue began to
focus on the economic, political and cultural status of indigenous groups, resulting in
legislation and funding meant to promote and protect indigenous languages and
provide money for bilingual education. A report by the Minorities At Risk Program
7

U.S. Agency for International Development

8

John Booth, “Global Forces and Regime Change: Guatemala within the Central American Context,”

1998.
9

B. Abom, "Social Capital, NGOs, and Development: A Guatemalan Case Study" in Development in

Practice, 2004.
10

Roger Plant, Indigenous Peoples and Poverty Reduction: A Case Study of Guatemala for Inter-

American Development Bank, 1998.
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notes however, that this essentially amounted to lip-service, and actual followthrough is yet to be seen.11 Ultimately, the Guatemalan government attempts to
specifically address the needs of indigenous people, but ends up adapting their
programs to address broader issues, such as poverty or education, rather than
adapting the programs to serve indigenous communities.
While there are all of these programs and organizations currently operating in
Guatemala, it is clear that they are not functioning as they should for Guatemala’s
indigenous population. This is clear from the lack of improvement in any of the
economic markers noted above, such as poverty, health and education. Furthermore,
these same programs are functioning for Guatemala’s ladino population, which has
seen an improvement in their living conditions. The difference in the results between
these two groups naturally raises the question of why this type of program is
significantly less effective for Guatemala’s indigenous population than it is for its
ladino population. Why are these programs not reaching this portion of Guatemala’s
population? Additionally, there are some programs that are beginning to see some
initial success on a local level, such as Qachuu Aloom, a garden project in Rabinal,
Guatemala. Why might this project be succeeding, when other similar projects are
not?

Literature Review
When considering economic and political development in underdeveloped
countries, there are two major camps of thought, that of modernization theory and

11

"Assessment for Indigenous Peoples in Guatemala." Minorities At Risk.
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that of dependency theory. These two theories differ on many aspects, but perhaps
the biggest difference between them is what they view as the restrictions or obstacles
to development that underdeveloped countries face.
Modernization theory consists of the idea that development happens in an
essentially linear fashion. It holds that all communities or societies follow the same
general template in order to achieve modernity. This “template” is based on the
historical development of countries such as the United States, Germany and France,
to name only a few. Because of this, all developed countries were once in a state
similar to the state underdeveloped countries are currently in. Under modernization
theory, the way to help underdeveloped countries out of poverty and into a more
developed state is by accelerating them along this common developmental path. This
is often done through investment by developed countries. Additionally,
industrialization is valued under modernization theory, as technology is seen as a
prime marker of whether or not a country is developed. A current case that is often
pointed to as an example of modernization theory in practice is that of China, which
has forged ties with more developed nations in order to grow its own economic
future.
Modernization theory views underdevelopment as a direct consequence of a
country's internal characteristics, directly connected to the continuance of traditional
economies, traditional psychological and cultural traits, and traditional institutions.12
From this perspective, traditional values are not only mutable but must be replaced

12

Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East, 1958; Myron

Weiner, Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth, 1966.
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by modern values in order for these societies to follow the path of capitalist
development. Modernization theorists might argue that the reason that aid
organizations and aid programs are not working in Guatemala is because they still
put too much emphasis on cultural differences. In order for indigenous people to
catch up developmentally with the rest of Guatemala (and for Guatemala to catch up
to the developed world), traditional Mayan values and institutions would need to be
put aside.
One of the central claims of modernization theory is that economic
development is linked to predictable changes in culture and social and political life.
Stephenson notes, “The concept of modernization has to do with a transformation of
culture and of personality in so far as it is influenced by culture.” 13 Inglehart and
Baker agree, saying “the rise of industrial society is linked with coherent cultural
shifts away from traditional value systems, and the rise of postindustrial society is
linked with a shift away from absolute norms and values toward a syndrome of
increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting, post-industrial values.”14 In this view, the
biggest obstacle for the development of Guatemalan indigenous people is their own
self-identification as indigenous (and the values and traditions that go along with that
self-identification). In order to develop, they must shift away from this identification,
and thus, any aid that acknowledges or makes special concessions for this identity is
actually hindering their ability to develop.
13

John B. Stephenson, "Is Everyone Going Modern? A Critique and a Suggestion for Measuring

Modernism" in American Journal of Sociology, 1968, p. 265
14

Ronald Inglehart and Wayne E. Baker, "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of

Traditional Values" in American Sociological Review, 2000, pg 49
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Dependency theory, on the other hand, has a very different view of the
development process. Dependency theory first emerged as a response to
modernization theory, and it argued that the aid that modernization theory presented
as necessary for development actually had a very different purpose. Instead of
serving as a way to empower and help develop those receiving the aid, dependency
theorists see aid as a way to make the recipients become indebted to the givers. By
receiving aid instead of having to provide for the goods or services themselves,
underdeveloped countries become dependent on receiving this aid from more
developed countries. Furthermore, dependency theory argues that not all countries
develop along the same lines, rejecting the “template” model previously outlined.
Instead, each country has its own specific traits and characteristics that direct and
shape the ways in which it develops.
Dependency theory notes that poorer nations, or “periphery” nations, are at a
social and economic disadvantage to more developed nations, or “core” nations. In
part, this is because periphery nations’ economies are substantially composed of
importation and exportation, rather than internal trade. Because of this, periphery
nations structure their production, not so that it fulfills their needs, but rather so that
it fulfills the needs of the core nations with which they trade.
Dependency theorists would argue that the reason so many of these aid
organizations and aid programs fail is that they are too intent on achieving some
external marker of “developed.” Instead of accepting aid in the form of modern
technology and amenities, it would be better for Guatemala to be able to decide what
they need most and what they are able to provide internally.
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There is another method of looking at development, which is neither
modernization theory nor dependency theory, although it bears many resemblances
to dependency theory. In their book, The Subsistence Perspective: Beyond the Global
Economy, Maria Mies and Veronika Bennholdt-Thomas craft and define a new
approach to examining how economies (and the cultures that frame them) develop.
Like dependency theory, the subsistence perspective views international trade as
being exploitative towards the oppressed parties or nations.
The subsistence perspective, like dependency theory, believes that the catchup development model espoused by modernization theory is not only undesirable,
but is not even possible under the current global system. It is not desirable because it
prioritizes a Eurocentric model of development; the proponents of the subsistence
perspective point out that capital accumulation does not, in and of itself, fulfill any
needs, except for making it possible to participate in the global market. Unlike
dependency theory, which still defines development within a capitalist framework,
the subsistence perspective focuses on what they call the “view from below,” which
values an individual’s ability to “produce and reproduce their own life, to stand on
their own two feet and to use their own voice.”15 This is contrasted with the “view
from the top,” which is primarily concerned with the growth of the invisible forces of
the market and assumes that everyone’s life would be better off with the
accumulation of more capital. Instead, the subsistence perspective values subsistence
production over commodity production, and advocates for local markets that serve

15

Maria Mies and Veronika Bennholdt-Thomsen, The Subsistence Perspective: Beyond the

Globalized Economy, 1999, p. 3
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local needs (rather than local needs being served through imports and long-distance
trade).
In addition to examining the ways in which economic relationships can
disadvantage and oppress one of the parties (which dependency theory also
examines), the subsistence perspective claims that social and political oppression is
the root of the economic oppression. The authors of The Subsistence Perspective
examine this primarily from a feminist perspective, but it also applies to other,
similarly unbalanced economic relationships, such as those between peripheral and
core nations. As part of their argument establishing the subsistence perspective as a
feminist perspective, the authors discuss how the violence of the on-going,
continuous colonization of women reinforces global capitalism.16 Part of this
colonization is the systematic oppression and devaluation of women in the market
economy. They argue that looking how the group has been marginalized and
oppressed serves as a way to combat the actual effects of hegemonic ideas, which is
more helpful for substantial development than simply trying to reduce dependency.
Approaching the Guatemalan case from a subsistence perspective, one would argue
that the majority of aid projects fail because they do not attempt to understand the
social and political oppression of the indigenous people of Guatemala, which leaves
them unable to actually change the heart of the problem; instead, they only can treat
the symptoms: poverty, poor health and poor education.

16

Mies and Bennholdt-Thomas, p. 30
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Hypothesis and Methodology
While there have been millions of dollars and many organizations working in
Guatemala to effect economic change, results have for the most part been negligible.
However, Qachuu Aloom, a NGO in Rabinal, Guatemala, has seen some success.
Looking at this case through the subsistence perspective, we would expect to see
certain characteristics, both in the relationship between the indigenous population
and the state, and in the organization’s methods that are apparently effective.
First, the subsistence perspective looks at the relationship between the two
groups or parties at issue: the relationship between the oppressed and the hegemonic
economic system doing the oppressing. For the authors of The Subsistence
Perspective, the oppressive hegemonic economic system that they were concerned
with was the patriarchy; for this case, it is the Guatemalan state and their attempts to
enter the global capitalist marketplace. Through the lens of a subsistence perspective,
we need to understand this relationship, and the ways in which the indigenous people
of Guatemala have been oppressed, because in order for there to be developmental
progress, the marginalization needs to be combated directly. In order to understand
this relationship, the history of the indigenous people of Guatemala must be
examined closely for the development of marginalization and oppression.
Once the sources of the oppression have been identified, we can actually look
at the organization, Qachuu Aloom, and its practices. Below is a description of how
the case study of Qachuu Aloom was conducted. We will also briefly examine
another organization in Rabinal that is not seeing similar results to Qachuu Aloom,

P a g e | 13

Plan Guatemala, and its success (or lack thereof) at addressing the oppression of
indigenous people.
Finally, we will be able to evaluate whether Qachuu Aloom is actually
addressing the oppression of indigenous people and is effective for that reason, or if
there appears to be a different reason for its success. The subsistence perspective
may allow us to better understand how aid can best serve those who need it the most.

Case Study
Qachuu Aloom was chosen for this case study for a variety of reasons. First,
they work almost exclusively with indigenous people in Guatemala; most of the
participants are part of the Maya Achi people, and the board of directors is composed
of indigenous people as well. One of the co-founders, Sarah Montgomery, is from
the United States, but the project has largely been spearheaded by Achi members of
the community. This is important because one of the features of a subsistence
orientation is that it is perpetuated on a local level by people involved in the
community. Additionally, it is important because having an Achi co-founder and
being led by an Achi board of directors is atypical in Guatemala. The second factor
that led to Qachuu Aloom’s selection is that it is unusual among aid projects due to
its methodology and missions, many of which are compatible with a subsistence
orientation. Qachuu Aloom encourages gardens not so that its participants can sell
the produce, but rather to provide produce for the participants, who are also
encouraged to work with and share information with neighbors and friends. The third
reason Qachuu Aloom was chosen is that I had previous personal experience with the
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organization. Because of this, I am familiar with the setup of the organization and
could add my own personal knowledge to the case study. Furthermore, because I had
previously worked with the organization, I already had connections to various
members of the organization, better enabling me to perform interviews with the key
players in the organization.
In order to create the case study of Qachuu Aloom, several interviews were
conducted. The most substantial were with Sarah Montgomery, one of the two cofounders of Qachuu Aloom. Montgomery was interviewed twice: once by email, in
January of 2012, and once through the video chat service Skype, on February 10,
2012. Additional email correspondence was also conducted with Montgomery.
Additionally, Cristobal Chen, the second co-founder of Qachuu Aloom was also
interviewed via Skype, also on February 10, 2012. Finally, Edson Xiloj, the director
of Qachuu Aloom, was interviewed, also via Skype on February 10, 2012. Besides
the interviews, Qachuu Aloom’s website and the content posted on it were accessed,
and I was able to add my personal knowledge of the organization; in 2007 I spent 6
weeks working with them in Rabinal, Guatemala.
In addition to the case study of Qachuu Aloom, another organization,
Plan Guatemala, will be briefly examined. An evaluation of Plan Guatemala that was
created for Plan International, the parent aid organization was used, as was Plan
Guatemala’s website. Plan Guatemala was selected in part because of this
evaluation’s availability; actual, in-depth critiques of individual aid projects can be
difficult to find on-line. In addition to this, Plan Guatemala was chosen because, as a
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local branch of an international organization, its methods and even its goals were
likely to be very different than those of Qachuu Aloom.
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Chapter Two: Understanding Indigenous Marginalization
Under subsistence perspective theory, it is essential to not only acknowledge
the fact of oppression and marginalization, but to understand the source of that
oppression. The historical context is necessary; in order to be able to move on and
develop, one must counter the hegemonic ideas that led to the oppression in the first
place. In this section, a deeper understanding of the indigenous people of Guatemala
and their relationship with the state will show how first isolation was used to
depoliticize the indigenous people. Next, hostile actions, such as genocide, were used
to terrorize indigenous people by utterly annihilating huge portions of the population,
which served to oppress and control indigenous people through fear and violence.
Finally, through forced relocation and aldeas modelos, or model villages, the state
was able to further dissolve ties, not only between the state and indigenous people,
but among indigenous people and between indigenous people and their land, making
political mobilization and representation near impossible.

Indigenous In Guatemala
Examining the indigenous population of Guatemala can be difficult, as there
is no set definition of who qualifies as part of that population. “Up to, and including,
the 1985 constitution, there is still no legal definition of who may be regarded as an
indígena.”17 It is not clear that there even is a way to define who is a part of the
indigenous population, as many proposed indicators are based on mutable social
characteristics. How many indigenous people live in Guatemala “depends on how
17

Adams 1994, p. 156
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one defines who is a Maya, a question that is complicated by factors of perception,
social definition, identity, social change, politics and technical usage.”18 The main
factors typically considered when identifying the indigenous include land, religion,
language, clothing, and beliefs. However, in Guatemala, land ownership is highly
contested, and religions can be converted, languages learned, clothing changed.
Ultimately, most scholars have allowed their basis to be one of identity: an
indigenous person of Guatemala is one who self-identifies as such.
The history of the indigenous in Guatemala is a complex one. Lovell
comments that for Guatemalan Maya, conquest is not a remote, historical experience,
but a visible, present condition.19 This may be in part due to the way in which
Guatemala became an independent country. The official withdrawal of Spain and
Portugal from Latin American in 1821 had less of an impact than the withdrawal of
colonizers in post-imperialism Africa and Asia. “The [indigenous] peoples in much
of the region had been not only conquered, but invaded, occupied, and internally
colonized.”20 The former rulers did not return to Europe, like the colonizers of Africa
and Asia mostly did. Rather than a fresh start, many of the Europeans and Mestizos
remained in power, ultimately altering the inherent social and political structure of
these countries very little.

18

Adams 1994, p. 156

19

George W. Lovell and Christopher H. Lutz, "A Dark Obverse: Maya Survival in Guatemala: 1520-

1994" in Geographical Review, 1996.
20

Richard N. Adams, "Ethnic Conflict, Governance, and Globalization in Latin America, with Special

Attention to Guatemala," in Ethnic Conflict and Governance in Comparative Perspective: A
Workshop Report (Working Paper Series), 1995, p. 52-3
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Since then, Guatemalan indigenous people were, for the most part, not
assimilated into the European-Guatemalan society and culture, nor was there much
of an attempt to do so, by either side. A government agency, the National Indigenous
Institute was formed, but was given minimal funding and was never able to create
any projects that would have any very significant impact on the Indian population.
Its funding was cut constantly and later abolished entirely.21 Instead, indigenous
people were generally dismissed and excluded from society. “The general pattern of
civil response to Indians has traditionally been to ignore them as much as possible, to
shunt them aside or to try to negotiate a quick and easy solution.”22 The Maya
population, despite being a significant percentage of Guatemala’s overall population,
was unnecessarily marginalized and not afforded the same rights and opportunities as
ladinos.
However, we must be clear that this was de facto discrimination, not de jure.
“In Guatemala ‘fact’ and situations that seem to be realities do not appear in the
national legislation. Nevertheless… legal documents do not establish discrimination
against the indigenous people.”23 All of these factors led to indigenous people having
very little political agency and being excluded from the general Guatemalan society.
However, the relationship between indigenous people and the Guatemalan
government was, at this point, not a hostile one. Instead, the two parties mostly

21

Adams 1995, p. 54

22

Adams 1994, p. 159

23

Rodolofo Stavenhagen, Derecho indigena y derechos humanos en América Latina, 1988, p. 271
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ignored the other; while indigenous people did not participate in the political sphere,
they also had very few regulations placed on them.

From Land Reform to Genocide
From 1944 until 1954, there existed a period of Guatemala’s history known
today as the “Ten Years of Spring.” During this time, Guatemala’s first
democratically elected president Juan José Arévalo and his successor, Jacobo
Arbenz, ushered in a society far different than Guatemala had seen before, complete
with sweeping reforms, a society in which liberal ideas and ideals were taken
seriously. President Arbenz was able to institute substantial agrarian reforms,
expropriating more than half a million hectares of land and redistributing it to
roughly 100,000 peasants. The majority of these peasants were Maya, and the chance
to own the land that they worked on would have been unimaginable to their parents
or grandparents. This was one of the biggest steps for Guatemalan indigenous rights
that had occurred up to that point in Guatemalan history. Additionally, it helped give
the indigenous a voice in the political sphere, as becoming land-owners gave them
ties to Guatemalan society. Prior to this, few Maya actually held the deed to their
land, and most worked on the farms of ladinos.
However, the idealism and liberal society promoted by Arévalo and Arbenz
came to an end in 1954, when a group called the liberacionista army, aided and
equipped by the CIA, invaded. Fear of the United States led the army to pressure
Arbenz into resigning and going into exile. The liberacionista regime essentially
reversed all of the liberal reforms undertaken by Arévalo and Arbenz. The agrarian
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reforms were rolled back immediately, and the indigenous lost the land they had just
recently been granted. This understandably created a lack of goodwill towards the
state from the Indians.
In 1958, the army openly intervened in an election for the first time, by
impeding voting for anyone other than their candidate, General Miguel Ydígoras
Fuentes.24 For nearly 30 years (until 1985) Guatemala was led a series of what were
essentially

military

dictators:

although

most

of

them

were

supposedly

democratically-elected, the military is known to have interfered in the elections.25
Not all of the presidents during this time were elected; several took the reins through
the use of a coup d’état. During this time, the military was in a strong political
position, which allowed them to implement a constant state of siege, suspend a
majority of basic rights (including habeas corpus), and carry out assassinations,
kidnappings, and something that became known as the cavalry of terror.26
During this period, the president-generals focused on counterinsurgency
efforts against political opposition, which effectively prevented others from
participating in the political process. “The counterinsurgency campaigns of the 1970s
permitted the military to deepen its control over state and civilian institutions, and to
strengthen and make permanent its presence in the western highlands, where it had
traditionally been weak or absent.”27 The western highlands were where the majority

24

Jennifer G. Schirmer, The Guatemalan military project: a violence called democracy, 1998, p. 17

25

Robert Trudeau, "The Guatemalan Election of 1985: Prospects for Democracy" in Elections and

Democracy in Central America, 1989, p. 94
26

Jose Luis Cruz Salazar, "El Ejército Como Una Fuerza Política" in Estudios Sociales, 1970, p. 96

27

Schirmer 1998, p. 18
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of Guatemala Maya communities were located, and many of the “counterinsurgency
efforts” targeted indigenous leaders, as they were seen as potentially having a
political base.
As the military began to focus on this area, younger, educated indigenous
campesinos began to attempt to exercise some power of their own within Maya
communities, and began mobilizing strongly for guerrilla groups.28 As the
Guatemalan military began to be more and more controlling over every aspect of
government, Indians became more disillusioned with the government in general. By
1981, an estimated 250,000-500,000 in the Indian community supported the
guerrillas. Army intelligence estimated that there were at least 360,000 Indian
members of the largest and most organized guerrilla group, Ejército Guatemalateco
del Pueblo (Guatemalan Army of the Poor, or the EGP).29 This was a way that
indigenous people could participate in the political sphere and exercise their voice
against the government that had oppressed them and isolated them for so long.
Throughout most of the 1970s, counterinsurgency campaigns had been
focused very selectively, with the focus being solely on those individuals who were
actively involved in the guerrilla rebel groups or attempting to participate in politics
themselves. However, when President-General Romero Lucas García (1978-82) saw
that this method was unable to “eradicate the root of subversion,” the army moved
steadily from selective repression in 1978-79 to massive killings. The Panzós

28

Arturo Arias, "Changing Indian Identity: Guatemala’s Violent Transition to Modernity" in

Guatemalan Indians and the State: 1540 to 1988, 1990, p. 251-252
29

Arias 1990, p. 255
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massacre in May 1978 of 150 Kekchí Indians resisting having their land taken away
from them was carried out by a Guatemalan Special Forces Unit. Unfortunately, this
was only the beginning in a series of massacres.30
The military began operating under what is known as a “scorched-earth”
policy, where everything is killed or burned to the ground, in order to prevent both
survival and the possibility of regrowth. “The primary objective of this scorchedearth campaign—[known as] “OPPLAN Victoria 82” or “la pacificación” for
short—was to separate and isolate the insurgents from the civilian population with
full military support.”31 This meant that anyone could become collateral damage.
The absurd contradiction of scorched-earth tactics, however, is that in order
to accomplish this isolation, certain areas are targeted for massive killings: that is,
the military must treat the civilians they are to “rescue” as though they are
combatants, killing and burning all living things within the secured area. No
distinction is made between combatant and noncombatant. Indeed, in the eyes of the
army, there were no distinctions. If you weren’t for the army, you were necessarily
for the guerrillas. Colonel Noack, one of the leaders in the field during this time,
later commented that what the army failed to understand was “the phenomenon of
campesinos being between two armies and not necessarily belonging to either.”32
In this brutal campaign, the military was employing a strategy famously
espoused by Mao—they were trying to “drain the sea of water [civilians] to expose

30

Gabriel Aguilera Peralta, Dialéctica Del Terror En Guatemala, 1981.

31

Schirmer 1998, p. 45

32

Schirmer 1998, p. 48
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and kill the fish [guerrillas].” By depopulating an area and razing and burning it to
the ground, that piece of real estate is essentially drained of the resources that the
guerrillas need, depriving them of a fighting force, their logistical base, any sources
of intelligence, and their capacity to blend in with the general population.33
Many times, there was a lack of distinction between the guerrilla fighters and
the civilian population; ethnically, socially and geographically, they were cut from
the same fabric. Indigenous people who were otherwise uninvolved with the rebel
movement would help and cover for the rebels. This deepened the separation
between the indigenous population and the state: while the Indians felt no personal
connection to the military and even felt a certain disconnection, the guerrilla army
was composed people like them—often even their neighbors and relatives. The
guerrillas also went out of their way to help small indigenous communities. One
officer noted, “We would arrive at a village, and despite the shelling, we would find
no dead, no wounded, nobody…Later, we found out that the wounded or dead had
been hurriedly carried by back up to the subterranean guerrilla hospital.”34
Ultimately, however, this only enraged the army, and caused them to strike back
harder against indigenous populations.
The UN-sponsored Commission on Historical Clarification (“CEH”)
undertook a complete evaluation of the situation in 1999, and ultimately termed it
genocide against the Maya, despite the fact that the Maya were not the only ones
33
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killed, saying that genocide is defined by the intent to destroy a specific group, not
by the motive or reasoning. “For example, if the motive behind the intent to destroy
an ethnic group is not of a racist character, but rather a military objective, it still is
considered genocide.”35 Using the estimates of the CEH that 200,000 died (of which
only 42,275 deaths were documented) and a 1979 population of 6.8 million, one of
34 Guatemalans died. However, of the documented deaths, 83% were Mayans. If we
assume that proportion for all deaths, and further assume that half of Guatemala’s
population is Mayan (a conservative estimate) then 1 of every twenty Mayans died.36
However, this number may be artificially low; assuming that documented deaths and
undocumented deaths had the same proportion of Mayan victims is problematic.
Since Mayans in Guatemala are more distrustful of the government and have less
agency than ladinos in Guatemala, it is likely that Mayan deaths were under-reported
relative to ladino deaths, leading to a higher percentage of Mayan deaths in the
undocumented deaths than in documented deaths.

Aldeas Modelos
After OPPLAN Victoria, the military’s next course of action was placing
refugees in aldeas modelos (model villages), under a strategy called the Plan of
Action in Areas of Conflict (PAAC). This plan was known as “Techo, Trabajo y
Tortilla” (Shelter, Work and Food), and the idea was that “tamed Indian
communities—no longer a political threat—would generate new income for
themselves and the tottering national economy by farming and selling new cash
35
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crops.”37 This program relocated thousands of Maya to state-run housing, where they
were kept employed through work in the fields, growing cash crop staples such as
corn, coffee or bananas.
These aldeas modelos had three major effects on the marginalization of
indigenous people in Guatemala. The first was from isolating them from their
communities. Villages were not necessarily kept together in the same aldea modelo,
which decreased individuals’ ability to mobilize by separating them from people they
knew and trusted.
The second major effect of the aldeas modelos was from the forced
relocation of the indigenous people. As discussed earlier, land ownership was a
highly contested subject in Guatemala. Very few indigenous people actually owned
the land they lived on, in the eyes of the state. They did not have deeds to the land,
for example. This meant that when they were eventually released from the aldeas
modelos, they did not really have anywhere to go back to. If they did, it was possible
that someone else would have claimed their land and they would have no legal
recourse. Additionally, even if no one else had claimed their land, because of the
scorched earth practices, most homes and towns had been utterly destroyed and razed
to the ground.
The third major effect of the aldeas modelos was from the use of cash crop
farming. This established cash crop farming in Guatemala as a dominant economic
tool. When people were released from the aldeas modelos, they had become familiar
with the tools and practices necessary for growing and harvesting cash crops.
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Additionally, since they had no land that they had ties to, many of them began
working on larger farms, rather than working their own land. Many of these larger
farms produce cash crops for the purpose of exporting it.
Ultimately, the aldeas modelos allowed the state to isolate and marginalize
indigenous people even more than before. However, with the aldeas modelos,
indigenous people as a group were not being separated from the state. Instead, the
aldeas modelos served to isolate individuals, by separating them from their support
system, and by relocating them and making it near impossible to return to their land.
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Chapter Three: Rabinal: A Case Study
Rabinal is a small municipality in the department of Baja Verapaz. It sits
nestled in the Sierra Chuacas Mountains in the central part of Guatemala, less than
100 km from Guatemala City. Despite its relative proximity to the capital of
Guatemala, Rabinal is fairly isolated; getting there by bus takes at least 4.5 hours, if
not more.
Rabinal is predominantly Mayan—the latest census data shows that of the
approximately 31,000 people, 82% identifies themselves as indigenous, which is
significantly higher than the national estimate.38 While Spanish is taught in schools,
many people also speak the native Mayan language Achi’, either as their first or
second language. Its high number of indigenous people led to Rabinal being targeted
especially heavily during the massacres carried out against Mayan communities
during the 40-year civil war that engulfed Guatemala. The Río Negro Massacre, the
largest documented massacre carried out during the war with nearly 500 killed, took
place in Río Negro, a community in Rabinal.
The combination of being predominantly Mayan and being home to some of
the worst human rights abuses of the civil war has caused Rabinal to have especially
high levels of poverty and poor health. This has also made it home to many aid
organizations anxious to rectify the damage done during the war. These
organizations, however, have had mixed success.
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Plan Guatemala
One such organization is Plan Guatemala, the Guatemalan affiliate of Plan
International. Plan Guatemala has programs in 6 municipalities in Guatemala,
including one in Rabinal.39 Plan Guatemala acts as a contractual partner of the
national government’s Ministry of Health, and works to help the ministry put its
policies into action. For many people living in rural Guatemala, the government is
largely represented through contracts like this one.40
However, this relationship with the government is constantly tenuous. An
internal evaluation of Plan Guatemala that was recently made public noted that
“there remains a high level of skepticism within the government towards
international NGOs,”41 which affects the work that Plan Guatemala is able to do. The
evaluation noted that Plan Guatemala has little ability to advocate for “alternative
government plans” and cannot organize public pressure on the addressing of human
rights concerns, as they fear risking their relationship with the government. This
means that their overall approach to development tends to be fairly orthodox.
Additionally, they gain traction within communities by taking advantage of existing
community structures, often working with city councils or the offices of local
government officials.42 While this has some benefits, such as an existing network
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and access to an established local authority, it also discourages true change, as it
connects Plan Guatemala with the establishment of the state.
Plan Guatemala, like many other aid organizations, gives out material goods
as part of their projects. The material goods vary depending on what the project is,
but in the past have included water purifiers, fertilizer, and medicine. However,
when the evaluation was being conducted, community members “frequently
expressed their regret at not receiving more material help by Plan.”43 People were so
accustomed to receiving material aid that they felt Plan Guatemala was not giving
them enough supplies.
Although Plan Guatemala has the support of both the state and the
international organization behind it, the evaluation noted that it is struggling to gain
footing in Rabinal, like many other organizations had. Oxfam, Action Aid and Save
the Children had all had offices in Rabinal since 2008, and all of them are no longer
operating there. Plan Guatemala at one point worked in 22 communities throughout
Rabinal, but is now down to only 9. Furthermore, follow-up interviews in
communities after Plan Guatemala “phased out” its operations show that the work
done thus far has not been sustainable. “Community respondents observed a decrease
in municipal activity and responsiveness after Plan terminated its activities in the
area.”44 As a result, the patterns of dependency continue to exist in the area. This
calls into question the effectiveness of Plan Guatemala and similarly-structured
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projects. As one manager self-critically reflected, “I am not sure that you will see
[Plan Guatemala] ten years from now.”45

Qachuu Aloom
In 2003, Sarah Montgomery came to Rabinal with the intent of starting an
organization for widows of the massacres on a home-gardening project. She quickly
realized that many larger organizations had already been created with similar goals—
but the projects had fallen apart relatively quickly. While local families would
participate in the projects, their participation would only last for as long as the aid
organizations were active in the region. Montgomery notes that “when the aid
organization moved on, the families would stop planting their gardens.”46
Montgomery (and Plan Guatemala)’s experience with this is not unusual.
When she asked local women, Montgomery was told that the reason that the
projects did not continue after the aid organizations left was that the materials needed
to continue the project were too expensive to buy if an organization did not give
them the materials for free. Without chemical fertilizers, hybrid seeds, and
pesticides, the families did not know how to continue the project they had been left
with—after all, they had been told that these supplies were not only better than their
previous methods, but that these supplies were necessary.
Unfortunately, supplies like these are part of the problem. Chemical
fertilizers deplete the soil of nutrients. Aid organizations typically offer hybrid seeds,
which produce bountiful crops, but do not produce well in the second planting,
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which discourages farmers from saving seeds. As pests became resistant to the
pesticides, they had to use more and more of them. Because of these factors (and
others), the departure of aid organizations do not leave the farmers better off than
they were prior to the aid—in fact, they are worse off, as their soil is depleted, they
have to buy seeds to plant the next season, and the pests are stronger and resilient.
As Montgomery considered these factors, she was approached by Cristobal
Chen, an Achi farmer who had lived in Rabinal all his life. In 1980, the Guatemalan
Army killed his newlywed wife and their child before his eyes, during the Río Negro
massacre. Chen had heard about Montgomery’s plans, and wanted to work with her.
He told her that he had approached other organizations in the past, but none had been
willing to work with him to change their model.
Chen was interested in implementing the Campesino a Campesino model
(CAC) in order to protect traditional Mayan agriculture. CAC is essentially a model
that facilitates farmers innovating and sharing their knowledge with their fellow
farmers. While variations of this model have existed for hundreds of years, the more
contemporary and more formalized version was developed locally in Guatemala and
spread through Mesoamerica beginning in the 1970s.47 It is based on farmerpromoters who have come up with new solutions to problems that are common
among many farmers or who have recovered or rediscovered older traditional
solutions, and who use popular education methodology to share them with their
peers. A fundamental tenet of CAC is that farmers are more likely to believe and
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emulate a fellow farmer who is successfully using a given alternative on their own
farm than they are to take the word of an urban agronomist or aid worker. This is
even more the case when they can visit the farm of their peers and see the alternative
functioning with their own eyes. Chen had worked with CAC in the past with other
farmers, and wanted to implement it in Rabinal.
Montgomery and Chen together founded an association which they named
Qachuu Aloom, which means “Mother Earth” in Achi’. Qachuu Aloom was created
to address the problems seen by each of its founders. It was a garden project, yet
utterly unlike those that had been brought to Rabinal in the past. Instead of
dispensing materials like fertilizers and pesticides, Qachuu Aloom led classes on
traditional methods and on seed production. While they did give out seeds, they
would require the farmers to pay back the seeds after the harvest, in order to
encourage the farmers to let a portion of the harvest go to seed. This allowed the
farmers not only to “pay back” Qachuu Aloom, but to collect seeds for themselves
for the following year.
This was not an easy sell to the farmers of Rabinal. In our interview,
Montgomery recounted the response she and Chen would receive.
“The first year as we went village to village trying to
promote the project, we would contact a community
leader and have them get people from the village
together. When we explained the idea, people would
raise their hand and ask, “What are you going to give
us? Metal for our roofs, seeds, fertilizers, animals, water
tanks?” And when we would explain that we were not
going to give anything away for free, more than half of
the room would get up and leave. They were not
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interested… It was much easier to wait for the hand-outs
from other projects.”48
The fact that they received the same (or a similar) response as Plan Guatemala did
only emphasizes how deeply engrained dependency is within this population.
Despite this, Chen and Montgomery were able to organize a core group of 12
Achi individuals, both male and female, who were interested in the missions of
Qachuu Aloom. As they began to work with this group, Chen encouraged them to
use the CAC model in order to spread their knowledge to their neighbors. “At first,
they said they felt embarrassed because their neighbors would make fun of them for
carrying cow manure and making compost piles. But then when those same
neighbors saw the results and realized that with a little work you could have free
fertilizer by making your own compost, they began to copy us,”49 he told me. By the
end of the first year, Qachuu Aloom was working with 50-60 individuals across
Rabinal.
Qachuu Aloom looks at individual gardens as serving three functions. They
produce vegetables for home consumption, alleviating the need to buy food from
others. They allow for some plants to go to seed; as the seeds that are given out by
Qachuu Aloom are open-pollinated (also known as heirloom) rather than hybrid, the
second planting of these seeds does not suffer the same problems as that of the seeds
given out by aid organizations. This helps break the dependency on outside aid
projects or on buying seeds from a store. Finally, (and this is seen as the least
important of the garden functions), they also produce vegetables for sale in the
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market, which both lowers the price of these vegetables for others by increasing
supply and provides for some cash income for the individual farmers.
Today, Qachuu Aloom works with about 500 families throughout Rabinal.
Not all of these families are Achi, but the vast majority is. They have expanded the
ways in which they work beyond classes and gardens, although those are still their
primary focus. Today, Qachuu Aloom buys surplus seeds from families and markets
them around the country. They promote these seeds to some larger aid organizations,
such as the FAO, CARE, SHARE, Catholic Charities, and Save the Children, all of
which now buy seeds from Qachuu Aloom. While working with larger aid
organizations may initially seem contrary to Qachuu Aloom’s goal of reducing
dependency, Montgomery suggests that selling to these organizations does work
towards that goal, as doing so allows “more small family farmers gain access to these
heirloom seeds again. Even if they received the seeds from an aid organization
initially, they don’t have to continue working with [the aid organization] in the future
but they’ll still have access to the seeds.”50
In addition to their national seed market, Qachuu Aloom has a garden of their
own, which they use as teaching center to demonstrate the traditions and techniques
to others. They also use this teaching center as “sort of a community center,” as
Montgomery described it to me. They host events there that celebrate Mayan
traditions and culture. Individuals involved in the project also will bring work there
and do it in a communal fashion. For example, Chen described to me groups of
women gathering to grind amaranth into flour and package it together; each woman
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brought her own farm’s harvest of amaranth, and left with her own amount of flour.
This Qachuu Aloom garden contains “a seed storage facility, rain-water catchment
tanks, a medicinal plant garden, compost piles, worm-bins for composting, a solar
plant drier, a solar energy-powered well, a cob building and a bamboo education
center.”51
Furthermore, Qachuu Aloom has begun to receive visits from groups, both
national and international, who come to learn more about their development model
and their implementation of CAC. They also have started a micro-lending program
that has given loans of $50 to $200 to more than 100 of their families to help them
start small businesses, and have a scholarship program that helps about 10 girls a
year attend school.
As Qachuu Aloom has expanded, it has faced opposition from outside forces.
Initially, local officials opposed Qachuu Aloom because they, like the farmers, liked
the type of development projects that brought in free materials. Often, local leaders
receive benefits from helping aid organizations manage donations. However, as they
saw the results and more people began working with Qachuu Aloom, Montgomery
saw this opposition fade away.
More serious opposition comes from the systematic devaluation of the type of
work that Qachuu Aloom does. The University in Guatemala City’s Agronomy
department, for example, requires students to do an internship at a related
organization or on a large farm prior to graduation. They sent an intern to Qachuu
Aloom one year, but then determined Qachuu Aloom was “too radical” and no
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longer approve Qachuu Aloom internships. Edson Xiloj, who had been the intern
who was sent to Qachuu Aloom, continues to work with the association today, as its
director. He explained, “They want their students to graduate and work for large
fincas [farms] who are exporting to the US. Many of the professors get their research
money from large companies like Monsanto, and some of them work for these
companies on the side, so they have a very different agenda, and want their students
to follow more conventional export models of agriculture.”52 He also noted that the
university classes taught that organic agriculture doesn’t work, and that local seeds
are useless. Xiloj was the only indigenous person in his class at the university.
It is not just the agricultural methods that are denigrated, however. Qachuu
Aloom also works to preserve the more ceremonial Mayan traditions that surround
agriculture. Montgomery noted “Because there is so much racism here, a lot of these
traditions are looked down upon.”53 When Xiloj first interned with Qachuu Aloom,
he viewed Qachuu Aloom’s workshops on these traditions as a waste of time. As he
became more familiar with the association, however, his views began to change.
Montgomery recalls how as he began to participate in the workshops, Xiloj told her,
“Sarah, this is nothing new; this is what I learned from my grandparents.”
However, Xiloj’s initial distaste for the traditions and workshops is not
uncommon, especially among the more educated. Qachuu Aloom has been described
as an “atraso.” In Spanish, this literally means “backwardness”—it is seen as going
back in time, not into the future. By incorporating ancient practices that have only
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recently fallen out of use in modern times, Qachuu Aloom is accorded little value,
much like Maya culture in general.
Besides the University, other aid programs oppose Qachuu Aloom.
Montgomery believes it is because they are having a more difficult time organizing
projects in the communities Qachuu Aloom works in. Because people now have their
own seed source to use to replant their gardens, as well as seeds to sell to bring
income to their families, they no longer are dependent on these other projects.
Montgomery added, “many times [the people] refuse to participate or force that
project to come to us to buy their seeds. The families we work with are seeing the
results of the project and learning to protect their seed source.”54
Today’s Qachuu Aloom is run by a board of directors and registered with the
Guatemalan government as a legal Non-Governmental Organization, or NGO. This
allows Qachuu Aloom to receive internal funding via grants and donations. The
board was initially made up entirely of Achi who had participated in the first few
years of the project. Montgomery notes the difficulty of this, since most of the
participants have little to no formal education. “Some of the women don’t speak
Spanish, only Achi’, and can’t read or write; many of the men speak Spanish but it is
a mixture of Spanish and their Native language Achi’.”55 However, to qualify for
grants (especially large government grants), Qachuu Aloom needs people with a
higher education level to help manage and run the programs. Montgomery explains,
however, that the problem is that “there is a large difference between the realities
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that they have lived versus the campesinos we work with on our staff, on our board
and in the communities. They use words that are too big, or talk too fast for people to
understand.”56
Overall, Montgomery feels that Qachuu Aloom has remained true thus far to
its initial mission. Qachuu Aloom has managed to reintroduce several native
varieties to the Rabinal area that had been lost. Additionally, the lives of the families
who participate in the program have improved—she notes that “many of our
members tell us they no longer need to go on seasonal migrations to work on the
coffee or sugar plantations on the coast.”57 Instead, the members are able to provide
enough food for their families and generate enough income to support their families
through selling seeds and vegetables at the local market.
Furthermore, Montgomery points out that Qachuu Aloom is set up so that it
does not need to be an active force for its projects to continue. Unlike the previous
aid projects in Rabinal, Qachuu Aloom focuses on providing workshops educating
the participants on the specific methods necessary to maintain and carry on the
project themselves. This means that if Qachuu Aloom were to be disbanded, the
current members would not lose this source of food and income, the way that they
did when aid organizations stopped providing fertilizers and hybrid seeds.
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Chapter Four: Conclusion and Analysis
In order to understand Guatemala’s indigenous people and how to best use
aid to actually make a substantial difference in their lives, it is essential to understand
the context of how they reached the point they are currently at. The subsistence
perspective advocates this, but many aid organizations ignore this in favor of a more
modernization-based approach.
Plan Guatemala, for example, uses a fairly orthodox modernization-based
approach in Rabinal, Guatemala. They attempt to make substantial change by gifting
material aid. However, they have not seen much of a change. Their own project
managers are discouraging about the future of Plan Guatemala.
Qachuu Aloom, on the other hand, uses more of a subsistence approach,
which pays attention to the ways in which individuals have been marginalized in the
past. By doing this, the thought is that aid is actually able to combat the
marginalization itself, and not merely the economic side effects of that
marginalization.
In Guatemala, the indigenous people have had a long and violent history with
the state. One of the clearest consequences of this is their complete and utter
isolation. They have long been isolated from the state and the economic market, as
indigenous people as a group were discriminated against and have no institutional
power. The state’s use of aldeas modelos also fostered isolation, albeit of a different
nature. That isolation came from the breaking down of support systems and
communities. The social capital that comes from a community can help mobilize and
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organize groups that are being oppressed, and the Guatemalan state destroyed that
capital for its indigenous population. In addition to becoming individually isolated
from one another, the aldeas modelos also severed indigenous ties to their land. Not
having land means that individuals are going to be more dependent on others, and in
many cases this meant that the landless individuals would go to work on a large,
internationally-owned finca, which only worsens Guatemalan dependency.
Qachuu Aloom’s methods work to counter this isolation. By encouraging
people to plant home gardens, rather than work on a finca on someone else’s land,
new ties to the land are being built. Additionally, these ties are strengthened through
Qachuu Aloom’s workshops that teach methods of improving the resources
available, such as natural fertilization or tiered gardens, as this promotes greater
understanding and familiarity with the land.
Far more important however, than ties to the physical land, is the social
capital that Qachuu Aloom is helping its participants gain. The Campesinos a
Campesinos model that they use encourages user-to-user communication and
collaboration. In addition to fostering a sense of community, they are also alleviating
the need to participate in the market that isolated them in the first place.
These methods, while irregular, do appear to be effective in the case of
Qachuu Aloom. Health and nutrition are improved among its participants, and other
markers not directly related to the gardening, such as school attendance among
children, are also improving.
It must be noted that this is only one case. Furthermore, the results have not
yet withstood the test of time; Qachuu Aloom is less than a decade old. However,
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neither of those facts lessens the validity or the effectiveness of Qachuu Aloom.
More research would have to be done before being able to say, with certainty, about
the overall effectiveness of these methods across organizations and cultures, but
these initial results are promising.
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